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HARVARD LAW REVIEWI
COMMENTARY
DETERRENCE AND DISTRIBUTION
IN THE LAW OF TAKINGS
Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier*
Supreme Court decisions over the last three-quarters of a century have turned the words
of the Takings Clause into a secret code that only a momentary majority of the Court is
able to understand. The Justices faithfully moor their opinions to the particular terms of
the Fifth Amendment, but only by stretching the text beyond recognition. A better
approach is to consider the purposes of the Takings Clause, efficiency and justice, and go
anew from there. Such a method reveals that in some cases there are good reasons to
require payment by the government when it regulates property, but not to insist upon
compensation to each aggrieved property owner In other cases, the opposite is true -
compensation to individuals makes sense, but payment by the responsible government
agency does not. Uncoupling efficiency and justice would invigorate the law of takings.
INTRODUCTION
Tphe law of takings couples together matters that should be treated
independently. The conventional view, shared by courts and
commentators alike, has been that any takings case can be resolved in
one of two ways: either there is a taking and compensation is due, or
there is no taking and no compensation is due. These results are fine
as long as one holding or the other serves the two central concerns of
the Takings Clause - efficiency and justice. But a problem arises
when the two purposes behind the law of takings come into conflict, as
they readily might. It happens, as we shall see, that in some takings
cases there are good reasons to require payment by the government,
but not compensation to the aggrieved property owners. In other cases
the opposite is true - compensation to individuals makes sense, but
payment by the responsible government agency does not. What is
needed, then, is a set of four possible resolutions, instead of the con-
ventional two; the two new resolutions become available when we un-
couple efficiency considerations from justice considerations, or, put an-
other way, when we uncouple "taking" on the one hand from
"compensation" on the other. The resulting set of four helps smooth
* Assistant Professor and Earl Warren DeLano Professor, respectively, at the University of
Michigan Law School. For their comments and suggestions, we are grateful to Greg Alexander,
Hanoch Dagan, Rick Hills, and the participants in a workshop at the Cardozo School of Law.
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out some of the many wrinkles for which the law of takings is re-
nowned.'
And new wrinkles keep turning up. In Phillips v. Washington Le-
gal Foundation2 the Supreme Court considered the meaning of the
phrase "private property" in the Constitution's injunction "[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. '3
The majority and dissenting opinions in Phillips took a range of inter-
pretive approaches to the issue, each seemingly sensible but none fully
faithful to the animating concerns of the just compensation require-
ment. The debate among the Justices ends up shedding little light on
the ultimate takings question in the case, which remains to be resolved
on remand. As the latest in a string of unsatisfying takings decisions,
Phillips proves less interesting for the answers it provides than for the
questions it provokes, at least in our minds. Despite all their differ-
ences, the Court's nine members implicitly agreed on one thing - the
possibility of a taking without compensation. This seemingly novel
notion has moved us to think anew about the conventional law of
takings, and to consider the virtues of an expanded approach. We
shall revisit Phillips at the end of our ruminations.
I. THE PURPOSES OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Begin with the aims of the Takings Clause. In a vast and other-
wise contentious literature, whether judicial opinions or scholarly
books and articles, there appears to be virtual consensus that the pur-
poses of just compensation are essentially two. Frank Michelman calls
them "utility" and "fairness" in an article that remains, more than
thirty years after its publication, the most significant piece of academic
commentary on our subject. 4 He could just as well have called them
"efficiency" and "justice," and in fact he later does Efficiency argues
I See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, io8 YALE L.J. (forthcom-
ing April 1999) (manuscript at 14o n.199, on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (collecting
colorful quotations on the daunting messiness of takings law).
2 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998). Throughout this essay, our discussion of Phillips draws from a com-
panion piece that considers the case in closer detail than is necessary here. See generally Michael
A. Heller & James E. Krier, Making Something Out of Nothing: The Law of Takings and Phillips
v. Washington Legal Foundation, 7 SuP. CT. EcoN. REv. (forthcoming 1999).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Phillips, 18 S. Ct. at 1928. The Fifth Amendment is made ap-
plicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
4 See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
5 See id. at 1219. It is unsurprising that most commentators think about the Takings Clause
in terms of efficiency and justice, because for several decades now judges and scholars have re-
garded those two values as the criteria by which to evaluate just about any legal outcome, See,
e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. IO89, 1093 (972) (suggesting that the reasons be-
hind the settling of entitlements in one party or another are "economic efficiency, distributional
preferences, and other justice considerations"). Michelman provides an analysis of efficiency and
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for allocating resources among alternative uses in ways that maximize
value; justice argues for distributing the costs and benefits resulting
from particular allocations in ways that satisfy some equitable princi-
ple of rightness.
Efficiency, in short, is about the size of the pie, and justice is about
who should get what piece. We prefer to think about these two con-
cerns in terms of deterrence and distribution, because doing so lets us
clarify some interrelationships that might otherwise be overlooked.
A. Deterrence - General and Specific
Richard Posner identifies one deterrence rationale for the govern-
ment's obligation to pay compensation. "The simplest economic ex-
planation for the requirement of just compensation," he says, "is that it
prevents the government from overusing the taking power.' 6 If the
government were free to take resources without paying for them, it
would not feel incentives, created by the price system, to use those re-
sources efficiently. A likely consequence would be the movement of
some resources from higher to lower valued uses. The aim to avoid
this tendency we shall call general deterrence.7
Specific deterrence has a related but nonetheless different purpose:
the obligation to pay compensation can constrain governmental incli-
nations to exploit politically vulnerable groups and individuals. s
James Kent, in his Commentaries, captured the essence of both kinds
of deterrence when he referred long ago to the compensation require-
ment as a "check" on government power.9
justice in the particular context of takings. See Michelman, supra note 4, at I 181-82 (arguing that
collective action must be judged in terms of allocative efficiency and distributive justice); id. at
i68 n.4 (arguing that allocation is judged in terms of efficiency and distribution is judged in
terms of fairness). Other takings literature reflects a similar analytic posture. See, e.g., WILLIAM
A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 216-17 (i995) (arguing
that the takings issue "involves fairness as well as efficiency"); Stephen R. Munzer, Compensation
and Government Takings of Private Property, 33 NoMos 195, 199-200 (1991) (arguing that the
theory of takings rests on a pluralist theory of property comprising principles of efficiency, justice,
and desert).
6 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58 (4 th ed. 1992); see also William A.
Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpreta-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 269-70 (1988) (arguing that the com-
pensation requirement serves the purpose of "disciplining the power of the state, which would
otherwise overexpand unless made to pay for the resources that it consumes").
7 Cf. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, III
HARV. L. REv. 869, 877-78 & nn.I3-14 (1998) (discussing other uses of the terms "general" and
"specific" deterrence and collecting citations).
8 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REv. 285, 306-
07 (i99o).
9 See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 275 (Da Capo Press, 1971) (1827).
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B. Distribution - Specific and General
The distributional function of just compensation is the one most
readily acknowledged by the courts. A familiar statement of the idea
appears in Justice Black's opinion in Armstrong v. United States:10
"The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be
taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."" As with deterrence, it proves useful to think about distribu-
tion in terms of the specific and the general. What we call specific dis-
tribution is simply the method of compensation that courts use in tak-
ings cases now: they determine and distribute the amounts due in
terms of each aggrieved claimant as an individual. 2
General distribution, on the other hand, is our own invention, dif-
ferent in method, and to some degree in purpose, from conventional
(specific) compensation. As we have already suggested (and will ex-
plain more fully below), there are occasions when the Takings Clause,
rightly considered, calls for payment of deterrence damages by the
government, but not for specific distribution of compensation to claim-
ants as individuals. Especially when a government regulation unduly
burdens many parties, high transaction costs may make it infeasible to
compensate each affected person through a specific distribution of in-
dividually tailored payments. At the same time, fairness might not re-
quire a specific distribution either. But it hardly follows that the re-
sponsible government agency should not have to pay, because
considerations of efficiency might call for payment as a deterrent, a
spur to appropriate incentives. When the government is required to
pay deterrence damages, but not to make a specific distribution, we
call the payment a general distribution. For example, the responsible
government bureau could be required to pay deterrence damages into
a special fund, or even into general revenues.' 3 (For our approach to
10 364 U.S. 40 (i96o).
11 Id. at 49-
12 As Justice Souter said in Phillips, "[A] court seeks to place a claimant 'in as good a position
pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken."' Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., i 18 S.
Ct. 1925, 1936 (998) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. 564.54 Acres Land, 441 U.S.
5o6, 510 (1979) (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934))).
13 Our development and application of uncoupling in the takings context is novel, but the gen-
eral idea of separating two things ordinarily tied together has appeared before. For example, sev-
eral states require defendants to pay part of punitive damages awards not to plaintiffs, but to
state treasuries or to special funds (where the amounts become available for specific or general
distributions). See, e.g., BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 614-18 (1996) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (collecting references to thirteen states that allocate part of punitive damage
awards to general revenues or to special funds directed to victim assistance, public medical assis-
tance, civil reparations, the state university system, a school for the deaf and blind, or low-income
attorney services, among other uses); .ee also A. Mitchell Polinsky, Detrebling Versus Decoupling
Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement, 74 GEO. L.J. 1231 (i986) (discussing
I00 [Vol. 112:997
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work in practice, fiscal boundaries must not be too porous, or else
damage payments could flow back to the responsible government bu-
reau and undermine the intended deterrent effect.14)
C. Interrelationships of Deterrence and Distribution
Deterrence and distribution are not always independent of one an-
other. Take the case of general deterrence. If compensation of any
kind is denied when justice would insist upon it, the result would not
only be unfair but might be inefficient as well. First of all, to relieve
the government of any obligation to pay is to forgo an opportunity to
test whether the benefits of a government program are truly worth its
costs, an important matter when the benefit-cost call is a close one.
Second, a program that would be efficient if compensation were paid
to burdened parties might be inefficient if compensation is withheld, as
a consequence of the demoralization suffered by the uncompensated
losers. Demoralization has to figure into the calculation of final costs
and benefits, and thus into the question whether a government pro-
gram enhances or diminishes net welfare. Specific deterrence impli-
cates similar efficiency concerns. If compensation were not required,
politicians would be inclined to support government projects that
benefit the privileged at the expense of the vulnerable. If the latter
lose more than the former gain, then this kind of singling-out promotes
inefficiency and injustice alike.
Interrelationships like these have an important bearing on the
choice between specific and general distributions, a point best ex-
plained by reference to Figure i below, which uncouples matters that
are conventionally bound together. Conventional wisdom allows for a
pairing of no taking/no compensation, the ordinary regulation that ap-
pears in Box i, and for a pairing of taking/compensation, the ordinary
taking that appears in Box 4. The familiar view overlooks an addi-
tional set of two, the pairing of taking/no compensation that appears in
Box 2 and the pairing of no taking/compensation that appears in Box
3.15
the idea of uncoupling the amount of antitrust damages paid by a defendant from the amount of
damages paid to the plaintiff).
In some rather unusual instances, we might need variations on the standard method of general
distribution, mechanisms that sidestep any actual payment by the government, yet still advance
the purposes of the Takings Clause. Phillips could be a case in point, and we shall consider it in
that connection later. See infra pp. 1018-22.
14 See POSNER, supra note 6, at 64 (noting how hard budget constraints can discipline public
officials).
Is Long-standing scholarly tradition places theoretical innovations in Box 4, but surely they
may appear, as they do here, in other boxes, like our Box 2 and our Box 3. See Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 5 (discovering Box 4); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules
and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 44o (1995) (exploring Box
1999] I00I
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Should there be
specific distribution
to claimants?
Should there be payment
by the government?
No Yes
Box i Box 2
No Ordinary Taking/No
Regulation Compensation
Yes
Box 3 Box 4
No Taking/ Ordinary
Compensation Taking
FIGURE I: Uncoupling Deterrence and Distribution,
Taking and Compensation
In Box i and Box 4 cases, efficiency and justice concerns can be
harmonized by one or the other ordinary route. Box I refers to cases
where neither efficiency nor justice calls for payment by the govern-
ment or to any individual; Box 4 has in mind cases where efficiency
and justice both call for the opposite.
Our new entries, Box 2 and Box 3, deal with purposes in conflict.
When we speak in Box 2 of a taking without compensation, we mean
a taking with no specific distribution, as opposed to a general one. A
general distribution that forces the government to pay (into some spe-
cial fund, for example) can advance general or specific deterrence,
even though the amount paid is not specifically distributed to claim-
ants. Beyond that, it is plausible to suppose that general distributions
can be formulated in such a way as to ease demoralization (an effi-
ciency concern) and promote a sense of fairness or justice, matters we
save for further discussion in connection with the Phillips case. 16
The idea behind Box 3 is more straightforward: there are occasions
when justice calls for specific distributions to aggrieved parties, even
though there is no taking (say because there is no reason to suppose
that deterrence is a matter of concern). Notice that we have a source
for such payments; among other possibilities, they could be drawn
from the amounts paid in by a government agency as general distribu-
tions in Box 2 cases.
16 See infra p. 1022.
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Our claim emerges from the foregoing. An expanded conception of
the takings picture - a move from two alternative resolutions to four
- can help resolve conflicts left unattended by current law. For a first
example of the proposition, return to Frank Michelman's great article
on takings.
II. A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF CROSS-PURPOSES
As his title suggests, 1 7 Michelman examines utility and fairness, ef-
ficiency and justice, as they bear on the question of compensation. He
develops a utilitarian (efficient) compensation rule and then goes on to
consider an alternative rule based on fairness. To make a very long
story very short, he defines the efficiency gains (call them E) of a gov-
ernment program as the excess of benefits produced by the program
over losses inflicted by it.18 Government programs that yield net effi-
ciency gains look to be a good thing from a utilitarian standpoint, but
Michelman sees that a thorough accounting must go further and con-
sider what he calls "demoralization costs" and "settlement costs." De-
moralization costs (D) consist of the sum of the dollar value of disutil-
ity that would be suffered if the losers in government programs and
their sympathizers were to go uncompensated, plus the present dollar
value of lost future production owing, say, to the impaired work incen-
tives of demoralized people.' 9 Settlement costs (S) are simply the
transaction costs required to make compensation payments to affected
individuals sufficient to avoid demoralization costs. 20
Michelman's model shows that when a government program yields
efficiency gains but" entails capricious redistributions, it necessarily
follows, if the program goes forward, that either demoralization costs
or settlement costs will have to be paid. If each of these, considered
separately, would exceed efficiency gains, the program should be re-
jected on utilitarian grounds. In other cases, since one cost or the
other has to be paid, the lower of the two should be chosen.
The essence of this conclusion can be captured by using the nota-
tions introduced above. Efficiency concerns would suggest a veto of
any program where E < D and E < S. But if E > D or S, then com-
pensation is due when D > S, but not when S > D.
Notice the unsatisfactory results that can follow. If S > D and a
denial of compensation would not be unfair (in other words, distribu-
tional concerns do not call for payment by the government to each ag-
17 Recall that his title is Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law. See Michelman, supra note 4.
18 See id. at 1214.
19 See id.
20 See id.
1999] 1003
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grieved party),2 1 then there is no taking, no compensation, and no
payment by the government. Suppose, however, that the size of E is
sufficiently questionable that we want to test the responsible govern-
ment agency's resolve by making it dip into its budget to pay for the
negative effects of its program. Michelman's approach cannot provide
this deterrent, but our approach can. Michelman's problem arises be-
cause he follows the conventional path, coupling payment by the gov-
ernment with specific distribution to the aggrieved parties. In the
situation we are discussing, however, specific distribution is by defini-
tion out of the question because of high settlement costs. The short-
coming in Michelman's approach is significant, because high S and
questionable E commonly go hand-in-hand.
We have no idea where Michelman would end up were he to con-
sider the alternative of a general distribution. In large part, his con-
cern is to find a harmony between utility and fairness in the rules of
decision that the courts have developed for takings cases, and to iden-
tify circumstances in which the legislative branch might improve on
what the courts are able to do. On the question of deterrence, he
seems to be ambivalent. As William Fischel observes, Michelman does
not say what should follow if the government decides to go ahead with
an inefficient program. 22 Fischel, on the other hand, shares our view
that compelling compensation in the case of a wasteful program
"would, as a practical matter, discourage a budget-conscious govern-
ment from doing it."23 But Fischel, like Michelman, has in mind only
specific distributions, whereas we want to consider, among other
things, the virtues that uncoupling make possible. Once general dis-
21 When S > D, the question remains whether the absence of compensation is consistent with
the demands of justice. Drawing on early work by John Rawls, Michelman concludes that the
fairness of a denial of compensation turns largely on the same considerations that enter into a
utilitarian calculation. An uncompensated taking is fair in any instance when a claimant "ought
to be able to appreciate how such decisions might fit into a consistent practice which holds forth a
lesser long-run risk to people like him than would any consistent practice which is naturally sug-
gested by the opposite decision." Id. at 1223. As William Fischel has noted, "The conditions in
which the landowner bites his lip and agrees that he should be able to see that noncompensation
is in the interests of all people like himself turn out to be almost the same as the conditions in
which settlement costs exceed demoralization costs .... " FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 199.
It is unnecessary for us to take any position on whether and when some view of justice and
fairness might require compensation notwithstanding that S > D. Our aim, rather, is to accom-
modate conflicting purposes in ways that the conventional approach cannot.
22 Fischel notes:
Michelman's analysis does allow that demoralization rises as benefits fall relative to costs,
and increasing demoralization is an argument for compensation. But the unstated pre-
sumption in that case is that the government will pay if that happens. The government is
not deterred by compensation; it is not induced to reevaluate the merits of the project.
FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 15 1.
23 Id. at 146; see also id. at 15i (noting that "governments required to pay for regulations can
quickly change their minds about the need for regulation").
1004 [VOL. 112:997
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tributions are introduced, an array of subtle responses becomes avail-
able to courts and especially to legislators.24
III. THE VIRTUES OF UNCOUPLING
Here we address government regulatory programs that impose
small (sometimes trivial) losses on aggrieved property owners. Under
the conventional view, analysis of cases arising from such programs
would no doubt begin (and quickly end) with Justice Holmes's opinion
for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.2 5 In deciding regu-
latory takings cases, Holmes said, a court has to consider, among other
things, "the extent of the diminution" in value caused by the govern-
ment program in question.2 6 "When it reaches a certain magnitude, in
most if not in all cases there must -be an exercise of eminent domain
and compensation to sustain the act."27 Of interest to us is the implicit
corollary to what Holmes said: in most cases in which losses are small,
there is no taking and no compensation is due. Indeed, as the Court
made clear a few years later in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.,28 even very substantial harms to property value can be insuffi-
cient to trigger the just compensation requirement.2 9
Holmes's statement in Pennsylvania Coal is unhelpfully abstract in
any number of ways. For example, "diminution in value" of what?
And what is the threshold of "a certain magnitude"? These are famil-
iar criticisms, but we have a new one to add. A blanket excuse for
small losses overlooks the difference between government programs
that impose small losses on a large number of people and programs
that impose small losses on only a small number of people. The two
categories are analytically distinct, as we can see by considering them
in light of Box 2 and Box 3 of the matrix we constructed earlier.30
24 While Michelman focuses on specific distribution, he nevertheless does point out, in a little-
discussed section of his article, the possibility of "settlement methods too artificial or innovative
for judicial adoption." Michelman, supra note 4, at 1253-55. He continues: "A court, it seems,
must choose between denying all compensation and awarding 'just' compensation.... Here is a
situation in which a legislature can impose a useful fairness discipline which eludes the grasp of
courts." Id.
25 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
26 Id. at 413.
27 Id.
28 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
29 See id. at 397 (finding no taking despite the plaintiff's allegation of a 75% reduction in
property value). But cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 5o5 U.S. 1003, 1027-31 (1992)
(holding regulations that wipe out the value of real property to be takings per se unless the regu-
lated uses amount to common law nuisances).
30 See supra p. 1002 fig.I. We will restrain ourselves from introducing yet another matrix at
this point, but we should mention two other logically obvious possibilities. Where a regulation
imposes large losses that are concentrated on a few people, both specific deterrence and fairness
concerns point us toward a Box 4 ordinary taking. The analysis is more complicated when regu-
lations impose large losses on a large number of people. Efficiency is obviously an issue because
there are large total costs, and justice is obviously an issue because there are large individual
1999] 1005
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
A. Box 2: Taking/No Compensation
i. Taking, but No Specific Distribution. - Imagine first a gov-
ernment program that has small negative effects on a very large num-
ber of property owners. The large number of affected parties means
that efficiency gains might be questionable and that settlement costs
would be high if specific distribution were the remedy. Specific distri-
bution makes for high S because the compensation process involves so
many transactions with so many parties. In contrast, general distribu-
tion requires only an estimation of average losses and does not entail
the expense of claimant-by-claimant payments, so it is a much cheaper
process. It is economical in another sense: compelling the responsible
government agency to confront the burdens created by its program
makes it feel the pressure of general or specific deterrence, and thus
promotes efficiency. As long as the general distribution would be re-
garded as fair by fair-minded people, the method neatly sidesteps the
sacrifices implicit in Michelman's approach to cases where S > D.31
Notice how the size of per capita losses is relevant to the fairness
issue and also to the matter of deterrence. As individual losses become
smaller, the argument for the fairness of a general distribution becomes
greater, because each losing party is burdened only a little. In con-
trast, as individual losses diminish, the argument for deterrence be-
comes weaker, at least prima. facie, because total costs are going down
and thus are more likely to be outweighed by total benefits. In conse-
quence, ultimate judgments about the need for general deterrence will
turn on estimations of the number of parties adversely affected, the
absolute size of the costs and benefits generated by the program in
question, the degree to which the program is accompanied by implicit
compensation (or a general distribution) to the burdened property
owners (Holmes's "average reciprocity of advantage" 32), and so forth.
At least some of these inquiries are familiar ones in conventional
analysis.
losses. At the same time, high settlement costs are likely to rule out specific distributions. The
next section suggests some of the factors that should inform our thinking about such cases. In any
event, the cases are unlikely to arise as a practical matter, because ordinary political processes
should tend to weed out programs that create a lot of misery for a lot of people.
31 If burdened parties do not receive specific distributions, who will litigate to ensure appro-
priate levels of Box 2 deterrence payments by the government? At present, public interest law
groups seem willing to bring suit in some cases of the type we have in mind, even when specific
distributions are very improbable (Phillips is an example). Moreover, the opportunity to compel a
general distribution should work as an incentive, often a sufficient one, for aggrieved parties to
sue. Beyond that, judicial awards of contingency fees based on the size of (and paid from) the
general distribution could provide powerful incentives to litigate, especially by way of class ac-
tions. Measures like the foregoing are unlikely to induce much litigation in cases involving losses
that are small per capita and in the aggregate, but those are precisely the cases not worth judicial
time and effort in any event.
32 Pennsylvania Coal, 26o U.S. at 4t5 (considering regulations on property use that benefit
property owners at the same time).
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It is a nice question whether the Supreme Court would accept gen-
eral distributions as the "just compensation" required by the Takings
Clause. The chief cause for worry is the Court's decision in Hodel v.
Irving,3 3 invalidating the Indian Land Consolidation Act of I983.34 A
century ago, Congress began allotting Indian reservation lands to indi-
vidual Indians, with the constraint that the owners could not sell or
partition the holdings. As the land passed down via intestacy or de-
vise, ownership was fractionated among so many heirs and devisees
that much of the land became unmanageable. The 1983 legislation
aimed to solve this problem by providing that low-value allotment in-
terests would escheat to the tribe, eventually consolidating the land for
tribal use. The Court noted that the legislation had little impact on
the expectations of the individual owners and produced benefits for
the tribes (of which the allotment owners were members) that were
"greater than the sum of the burdens imposed[,] since consolidated
lands are more productive than fractionated lands."3 It nevertheless
held that the Act worked an unconstitutional taking of "the right to
pass on property. '3 6
We do not know whether today's Court would let formalism trump
reason in this fashion. In our view, the Consolidation Act itself pro-
vided an acceptable method of general distribution. The government
gained nothing from the measure, and, as the Court itself acknowl-
edged, the Indians ended up with more than they had before.
2. Taking, but No Distribution at All. - It should be clear from all
we have said thus far that in virtually any case involving a govern-
ment program that imposes small losses on a small number of people,
a court should regard the action as a Box i ordinary regulation. After
all, in such cases concerns with justice and efficiency are both attenu-
ated, so there is no need for any deterrence or any distribution. Yet
the courts treat a significant category of these cases as Box 4 ordinary
takings, thanks to the conventional per se rule that government pro-
grams imposing permanent physical invasions always call for compen-
sation, period.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.3 7 is a familiar ex-
ample. The dispute there arose from a New York statute requiring
landlords to allow the installation of cable television equipment on
their buildings. 38 To be sure, the statute did in a sense take something,
a little space that belonged to landlords, but the taking was minuscule
in terms of both physical dimension (about a cubic foot per building)
33 481 U.S. 704 (1987); see also Heller, supra note i, at 152-54 (analyzing Hodel).
34 29 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2210 (I994).
35 Hodel, 481 U.S. at 715-16.
36 Id. at 716-17.
37 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
38 See id. at 42 1.
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and monetary value (one dollar per building).39  The de minimis na-
ture of the taking, in the Court's view, mattered not at all. Permanent
physical occupations authorized by the government are takings, even
though they yield significant public benefits and have "only minimal
economic impact" on property owners. 40
The physical invasion rule is passing strange. It operates inno-
cently (but unnecessarily) in cases that impose substantial economic
burdens or affect large numbers of people, cases in which deterrence
and distribution concerns already point in the direction of ordinary
takings. The trouble is that courts also extend the rule to cases in
which both the harm and the number of people affected are minimal,
even though neither deterrence nor distribution considerations suggest
any need for payment by the government or compensation to the
claimants. Because the losses suffered by all the affected property
owners are small in the aggregate, there is little reason to worry about
efficiency. And since the per capita losses are also small, there is no
reason to worry about justice either. Absent evidence that a politically
vulnerable group has been singled out and mistreated, there is no oc-
casion for specific or general deterrence, nor for specific or general dis-
tribution.
The thrust of our argument can be put another way. Cases like
Pennsylvania Coal and Euclid, taken together, grant ordinary regula-
tory programs the benefit of an overly broad "de maximis" rule, ac-
cording to which even very large individual losses might not trigger
government liability (without regard to the magnitude of losses in the
aggregate). Given that de maximis regulatory intrusions are to be re-
garded as unobjectionable, common sense suggests that there should
be a de minimis rule as well, applicable to all cases involving small
losses per capita (and in the aggregate).
And, of course, there is such a rule in conventional law, but it is not
applied to permanent physical invasions because, it is said, the land-
39 The majority argued that one and a half cubic feet were at stake, while the dissent claimed
it was only one-eighth of a cubic foot, see id. at 443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), a pretty silly dis-
pute. As for the monetary value, subsequent to the Supreme Court decision the New York courts
noted that the victorious landlord had never shown that "just compensation" exceeded the one
dollar the statute had specified and the Commission had found to be "reasonable compensation."
Loretto v. Group W. Cable, 135 A.D.2d 444, 448 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (denying the landlord's
claim for attorney's fees as the prevailing party).
40 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435. Temporary invasions, in contrast, are "subject to a more complex
balancing process," id. at 435 n.i2, though even then an actual physical intrusion is regarded as
"an unusually serious" consideration, id. at 426. As one can see, the Court attempted, unsuccess-
fully in our view, to distinguish permanent physical occupations from temporary limitations on
the right to exclude, such as the limitations in Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
77-79 (I98O), in which shopping mall owners were forced to admit picketers, and Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 166-69 (1979), in which property owners were forced to admit boat-
ers.
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owner's right to exclude deserves very special regard.41 But this spe-
cial consideration for physical intrusions overlooks the likelihood (or is
it the certainty?) that the average landowner, given the choice, would
rather suffer the small burden occasioned by a de minimis rule for
physical invasions than the substantial burden of the conventional de
maximis rule for ordinary regulations. The special importance of the
right to exclude could be handled (if it needs to be handled at all) by
establishing a diminution-in-value threshold substantially lower than
the one now applied in the case of regulations that do not work per-
manent physical invasions. Notice, though, that this move would not
be costless. Applying a lower threshold could replicate the bad incen-
tives that the conventional law creates now: other things being equal,
it is likely that government agencies prefer nonencroaching regulatory
programs that impose substantial (but noncompensable) social harms,
as opposed to more efficient alternatives that involve relatively minor
physical encroachments (the costs of which the agencies have to
bear).4 2
B. Box 3: No Taking/Compensation
Turn to cases in which justice calls for compensation even though
efficiency does not. The conventional approach leaves no room for
such instances, whereas our approach accommodates them readily.
Hadacheck v. Sebastian,43 a standard entry on everyone's list of
troubling takings decisions, provides a good example. The petitioner
there had purchased land because it contained a bed of clay valuable
for making high-quality bricks. Used for making bricks, the land was
worth $8oo,ooo, but when the land was put to the next best use, its
value plummeted to $6o,ooo. 44 The tract was outside the city limits
and far away from any residences, and for all anyone could have fore-
seen, that would always be the case. But progress intervened, the city
41 According to the Court, impinging on the right to exclude "is perhaps the most serious form
of invasion of an owner's property interests." Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435. The Court explained:
"The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an
owner's bundle of property rights." Id.
42 See FISCHEL, supra note 5, at I1 (noting that for regulators "regulations are often rational
substitutes for the physical acquisition of property"). Fischel's observation about substitution
suggests why there should be no compensation in a case like Loretto, even if transaction costs
might be low because the number of landlords is relatively small. No matter how low transaction
costs were in that case, they probably exceeded any demoralization costs occasioned by the ab-
sence of compensation. Beyond that, the New York legislation seems to be efficient (the benefits
from network externalities exceed the aggregate burdens, which are trivial even if a large number
of landlords are involved), and one could hardly suppose that landlords are a politically vulner-
able group. Neither fairness nor efficiency calls for any deterrence, and the substitution observa-
tion argues against any distribution, which would create a perverse incentive for government
agencies to choose less efficient regulatory alternatives.
43 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
44 See id. at 405.
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grew, and houses came to be built in the vicinity (perhaps they were
brick houses).45  The petitioner's operations had become a nuisance,
and the city enacted an ordinance that put him out of business.46
When the measure was challenged as a taking, the Supreme Court up-
held it as a valid exercise of the police power.47 No compensation was
due.
48
Hadacheck stands as a clear example of another per se rule in the
law of takings: diminution in property value caused by nuisance-
control measures never requires compensation. The rule has held
rock-solid ever since Hadacheck, at least with respect to common law
nuisances. 49 This is fine enough on the efficiency side of the ledger,
because there is usually little reason to worry about general deterrence
in cases like Hadacheck.5 0 Nuisances, by definition, reduce the aggre-
gate value of all the land they affect (the land that harbors them and
the neighboring land affected by them); the burdens imposed on own-
ers by government regulation of nuisances are outweighed by the bene-
fits to neighbors. Nuisance law itself is best considered as an effi-
ciency-enhancing measure.
Justice is another matter, however; the conventional takings law
treatment of nuisances does not necessarily promote fair results. In
Hadacheck, for instance, the neighbors had come to the nuisance, and
their doing so had been unforeseeable by all concerned. Beyond this,
the petitioner's activities involved not even the tiniest degree of moral
culpability. Why, then, should he have to bear the necessary costs of
admittedly worthwhile change? As far as we can tell, no commentator
has ever thought the result in Hadacheck to be fair. The case is par-
ticularly galling because the brickmaker's operations had surely bene-
fited the very community that later put him out of business.
Hadacheck does not stand alone, nor is the relevant category of
cases limited to coming to the nuisance situations. In Miller v. Scho-
ene,5 1 for example, the Court upheld a Virginia regulation that re-
quired the uncompensated felling of ornamental red cedar trees in-
fected with red cedar rust, a fungus that has no effect on cedars but
can prove fatal to nearby apple trees.5 2 "Apple growing," the Court
45 See id.
46 See id. at 4o6-07.
47 See id. at 409-I0.
48 See id. at 414.
49 The Court limited the rule to common law nuisances (at least in cases where the challenged
regulation wipes out property value entirely) in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1029-31 (1992), discussed below at p. 1o2.
50 The specific deterrence point is more complex, in part because courts are reluctant to ex-
amine the motives behind legislation. Hadacheck asserted that the zoning ordinance put him and
another brickyard owner out of business as a favor to competitors, who could then maintain a
lucrative monopoly. See Hadacheck, 2.39 U.S. at 407.
51 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
52 See id. at 278-89.
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noted, "is one of the principal agricultural pursuits in Virginia," 3 so it
was hardly surprising that the state opted to sacrifice the cedars. The
choice, while no doubt efficient, was hardly fair - absent compensa-
tion (of which, we concede, there was a little: the owners of the cedars
had "the privilege of using the trees when felled"54).
Just v. Marinette County55 provides another illustration. There,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an ordinance regulating the
development of wetlands did not work a taking, notwithstanding that
wetlands development had been a standard practice in Marinette
County for many years. Once again, the problem with Just is not effi-
ciency; the very fact that wetlands were disappearing no doubt in-
creased their value and justified their preservation. But because the
Justs had done nothing more or worse than their neighbors before
them, arguably they deserved compensation.5 6
Unforeseen circumstances can render inefficient a standard use or
practice that once had economy on its side. There is no need to deter
regulation in such instances (indeed, it should be encouraged); thus, the
responsible government agency should not be compelled to pay dam-
ages. The fact remains, however, that the regulatory programs we
have in mind often impose losses that should, as a matter of fairness,
fall on broader shoulders than those of the unwittingly offending prop-
erty owners.5 7 Our approach provides for just compensation through
specific distribution in these cases, yet it avoids the unwanted deter-
rence that would arise if the regulating agency were stuck with the
bill. Box 3 compensation comes not from the agency budget, but
rather from general revenues or from a special fund in which the gen-
eral distributions made in Box 2 cases of taking/no compensation (in
the sense of no specific distribution) have been banked.
Could courts require compensation in cases like these as a matter
of constitutional law? The answer turns out to be rather complicated.
53 Id. at 279.
54 Id. at 277. Fischel is of the view that high transaction costs would have made it infeasible
to compensate the cedar tree owners in Miller. See FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 153-54. But he is
hardly positive, and, reading his account, we are not so sure either. Of course, Fischel overlooks
the possibility that a general distribution might have been devised - not for the sake of deter-
rence, but for the sake of fairness. Although our Box 3 no taking/compensation category calls for
compensation by way of specific distribution, see supra p. 1002 & fig.i, there is no reason why a
general distribution could not be used in appropriate instances instead. The point of our matrix is
to expand the resolutions available for takings cases, so we are the last people who wish to be
bound by our boxes.
55 2oi N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
S6 And they probably would have received it in any number of states. See generally Charles
C. Marvel, Annotation, Local Use Zoning of Wetlands or Flood Plain as Taking Without Compen-
sation, i9 A.L.R.4TH 756 (1983) (noting a division among the states on the question whether wet-
lands regulation works a taking, and collecting cases).
57 Recall justice Black's admonition in Armstrong that individual property owners should not
be forced to "bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (Ig6o).
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As the Supreme Court explained in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,58 there is no property right entitling a landowner to commit
or create nuisances, because "the proscribed use interests were not part
of his title to begin with. '5 9 In this sense, then, regulatory measures
that control nuisances do not take property. But the Court in Lucas
went out of its way to limit its observation to activities amounting to
nuisances at common law. 60 These the government is free to police
without regard to any diminution in the value of the regulated land,
even a diminution to zero. On the other hand, programs aimed at noi-
some uses that are not common law nuisances remain subject (we pre-
sume) to the standard diminution-in-value test.
The point is this: if it is the common law of nuisance that frames
the situation, then it is appropriate to refer to the full body of nuisance
principles in determining the entitlements of land-ownership. One
such common law principle is the coming to the nuisance defense. Al-
though the defense does not necessarily entitle landowners to commit
nuisances unchecked, it has been held to entitle them to compensation
for their losses when encroaching neighbors move next to the nuisance
and then seek to abate it.61
Coming to the nuisance theory provides a basis for courts to award
compensation in some nuisance control cases as a matter of constitu-
tional law. But the argument is a tortured one, inapplicable to the ma-
jority of cases, in which the noxious uses in question do not amount to
nuisances at common law.62 Perhaps there is some basis for courts to
award compensation without a taking simply as a matter of equitable
jurisdiction; this seems to be the case in Germany.63 Most likely,
58 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
59 Id. at 1027.
60 See id. at 1029-31.
61 The standard example is Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d 700
(Ariz. 1972), which held that a feedlot was a nuisance but that, as a matter of fairness, others who
came to the nuisance should bear the costs of moving the operation or shutting it down, see id. at
708.
62 Hence the coming to the nuisance doctrine might be of no avail in a case like Miller v.
Schoene, in which the Court said: "We need not weigh with nicety the question whether the in-
fected cedars constitute a nuisance according to the common law; or whether they may be so de-
clared by statute." Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928) (citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394, 411 (1915)).
63 Gregory Alexander reports to us that the German system already offers a limited version of
what we propose:
In Germany, only the High Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has jurisdic-
tion to determine whether land-use measures are unconstitutional under Article 14, the
property clause, of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz, or Basic Law). That Court has
in several cases determined that a regulation does not violate Article 14 because it comes
within the scope of the Article's "social obligation of ownership" (Sozialbindung) clause.
That does not necessarily end the matter, however, for the Supreme Civil Court (Bundes-
gerichtshot) may subsequently determine that compensation is due as a matter of non-
constitutional law... The first case in which this occurred (no constitutional violation, but
compensation is due) is the famous "wet gravel" (Nassauskiesung) case.
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though, our Box 3 no taking/compensation cases are best handled by
appropriate legislative measures. Indeed, the legislature might be the
appropriate forum to implement our suggestions generally, for it is not
clear that courts have the authority - or, if they do, the administrative
capacity - to carry out general distributions.
IV. THE PHILLIPS CASE
Now we want to go back to Phillips v. Washington Legal Founda-
tion,64 the case that provoked this essay. For generations, lawyers
have pondered the question "What is private property?" The same is-
sue is obviously latent in every takings dispute, yet it is seldom aired in
any because the "propertyness" of the asset at stake in the litigation is
usually uncontested. In Phillips it was not.
Briefly, the story behind Phillips is this.65 Before i98o, the only
checking accounts that federally insured banks could provide paid no
interest. Lawyers used the accounts anyway for pooling and disburs-
ing certain funds entrusted to them by or for clients, namely any funds
too nominal in amount, or held for too short a term, to earn interest
net of expenses in a savings account. (Savings accounts were usually
used for large amounts held on behalf of individual clients.) Beginning
in i98O, the rules were changed to permit federally insured interest-
bearing checking accounts for some kinds of deposits; lawyer trust
funds could earn interest if charitable organizations received the inter-
est. States moved quickly to capitalize on the new rules by enacting
Interest on Lawyer Trust Account (IOLTA) programs. The programs
provide that any client funds otherwise incapable of earning interest
(that is, nominal and short-term amounts) are to be pooled together in
IOLTA accounts. The interest thereby earned by the aggregated funds
is then distributed to nonprofit organizations that render legal services
to the poor. Every state and the District of Columbia has such a pro-
gram, and in over half of them attorney participation is mandatory.
The plaintiffs in Phillips challenged Texas's mandatory IOLTA
program on several constitutional grounds, but the only question that
reached the Court, and the only one that shall concern us here, was
whether the interest on IOLTA accounts is private property for pur-
E-mail message from Gregory Alexander, Professor of Law, Cornell University, to James E. Krier
(Aug. 14, 998) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). On the "wet gravel" case, contrast
BVerfGE 58, 300 with BGHZ 9I, 20. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, Constitutionalizing
Property: Two Experiences, Two Dilemmas, in PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE PUBLIC
DIMENSION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY (Janet McLean ed., forthcoming 1999) (discussing these
cases).
64 118 S. CL 1925 (1998).
65 See generally Heller & Krier, supra note 2 (manuscript at 1-4, on file with the Harvard Law
School Library) (detailing the facts of Phillips).
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poses of the Takings Clause. 66 The district court rejected the plain-
tiffs' claims on summary judgment.67 Because the funds deposited
into IOLTA accounts are only those incapable of earning interest net of
costs, the judge reasoned that clients owning the principal lost nothing;
indeed, they never really had any property in the interest in the first
place. Given that there was no property, there could be no taking.68
The same logic must have figured in the thinking of the hundreds of
state judges who had previously considered the constitutionality of
IOLTA programs in the course of adopting them,69 and it supported
decisions by federal courts of appeals in two earlier cases.70
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit nevertheless
disagreed, choosing to apply a different but no less rigorous logic. 7'
The principal amounts deposited into IOLTA accounts are obviously
the property of the various clients who handed over the money. Under
Texas law, the Court observed, the general rule is that "interest follows
principal"; therefore, the interest must be the clients' property as
well.72 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
affirmed, noting that it expressed no view as to whether the Texas
IOLTA program worked a taking, or, if it did, whether any compensa-
tion was due. 73  Those were separate questions, to be decided on re-
mand. 74 Four justices dissented.7 5
66 See Phillips, u8 S. Ct. at 1928 In the lower courts, the plaintiffs also argued that the
Texas IOLTA program deprived them of First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and asso-
ciation by forcing them "to financially support, and thereby associate with, various recipient or-
ganizations whose purported objectives [they] find objectionable." Washington Legal Found. v.
Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 373 F. Supp. i, 9 (W.D. Tex. i995). The district court ruled
against the plaintiffs in part because "at least as far as the client is concerned, such a claim is nec-
essarily predicated upon the Plaintiffs' claim that the funds generated from the IOLTA accounts
are, in fact, the property of the client," id. at 9, a claim the court also rejected, see id. at io.
67 See Washington Legal Found., 873 F. Supp. at ii.
68 See id. at 7.
69 The highest courts of seven state; expressly held that the program was not a taking; another
thirty-seven state supreme courts, including that of Texas, used their rule-making authority to
adopt IOLTA programs, while five states adopted the programs by legislation. See Brief of Amici
Curiae Alabama Law Foundation, Inc. et al. in Support of Petitioners, Phillips, 118 S. Ct. 1925
(No. 96-1578), available in 1997 WL 476500, at *7-*8; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 348 (1982) (endorsing the ethical propriety of IOLTA programs).
70 See Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 976 (ist Cir.
1993) (upholding the Massachusetts IOLTA program against a challenge by the same public inter-
est law foundation that brought Phillips); Cone v. State Bar, 819 F.2d Ioo2, IOO6-o7 (Ith Cir.
1987) (upholding Florida's IOLTA program in a case where the client trust earned six cents per
month, an amount insufficient to yield net interest for the client).
71 See Washington Legal Found. v Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 94 F-3 d 996, 1OO4(5th Cir. 1996).
72 Id.
73 See Phillips, us8 S. Ct. at 1934.
74 See id.
75 See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg); id. at 1937
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg).
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A. The Court's Approaches
Much of the disagreement among the Justices in Phillips turned on
a question of interpretive method. How was the Court to determine
the meaning of the words "private property" in the Fifth Amendment?
The majority, following an approach we call contextual severance,76
considered the meaning of the phrase in isolation from "taken" and
"just compensation," the other operative words of the Takings
Clause." Then, perhaps realizing that "private property" cannot
meaningfully be defined absent context, 78 the Justices let the law of
Texas settle the point that IOLTA interest is the property of the owner
of the principal. 79
The majority's approach is hardly indefensible, at least from a legal
(as opposed to a literary) point of view. The Constitution is thought to
protect rather than create rights; the rights themselves are determined
by reference to "existing rules or understandings that stem from an in-
dependent source such as state law."80 This doctrine enabled the
Court, like the court of appeals before it, to pass the buck to Texas and
76 See Heller & Krier, supra note 2 (manuscript at 7-9, on file with the Harvard Law School
Library) (defining contextual severance and comparing the technique to the familiar move of con-
ceptual severance). "Conceptual severance" refers to the technique of identifying the relevant
property for constitutional analysis by severing particular property interests from other interests
that could logically be considered in conjunction with them. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Lib-
eral Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv.
1667, 1676 (1988) (defining "conceptual severance"); see also Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 16oo, 16oi (x988) (noting that the same phenomenon might also be called "enti-
tlement chopping"). In the case of IOLTA programs, a judge could employ conceptual severance
to find that the IOLTA interest is a discrete piece of property that was wholly taken, rather than a
part of a larger principal that was reasonably regulated.
77 The clause mentions "public use" too, but this requirement was not an issue in Phillips and
is pretty much a throw-away in any event, at least in the federal courts. See JEssE DUKEMINIER
& JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1112-16, 1214-15 (4 th ed. 1998) (discussing "public use"); cf. Jed
Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078-79 (1993) (arguing that the "public use" phrase is
the key to understanding takings). Oddly, the remaining words of the Takings Clause, "nor,"
"shall," "be," "for," and "without," have not generated much analytical action.
78 Private property is, as Jeremy Bentham said, nothing but "a basis of expectation[,] the ex-
pectation of deriving certain advantages from a thing," and that expectation "can only be the
work of law." i JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 137-38 (Boston, Weeks, Jordan
& Co. 1840). Hence the problem facing the Court in Phillips: if the Court were to say that the
interest is private property, then private property it would be; otherwise not. The resulting cir-
cularity can be avoided by at least two methods, one adopted by Chief Justice Rehnquist for the
majority, the other by Justice Souter in dissent.
79 The Court held that instances in Texas law in which interest does not follow principal were
"insufficient to dispel the presumption of deference given the views of a federal court as to the law
of a State within its jurisdiction." Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1931. That "two of the three judges" on
the federal court of appeals panel were Texans, id., apparently outweighed the inclinations of the
Texas Supreme Court (the justices of the Texas Supreme Court were petitioners in Phillips) on
this aspect of Texas law.
80 Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 565, 577 (1972), quoted in Phillips, 118
S. Ct at 1930.
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rely on its "interest follows principal" maxim.8 ' Never mind that
Texas itself had passed the buck earlier on, relying on English common
law. And the English judges had not really thought the matter
through either, at least not completely, instead satisfying themselves
with the notion that interest follows principal "as the shadow [does]
the body.18 2 Not once did Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the ma-
jority, pause to consider why anything should rest, at bottom, on such
shady reasoning.8
Justice Souter and the other dissenters disagreed with the major-
ity's clause-chopping method of contextual severance. They argued
that the words "private property" and "taken" and "just compensation"
should be considered together, rather than in isolation from each other.
Addressing the meaning of "private property" on its own had led the
majority to ignore "the most salient fact" in the case: that without
IOLTA, clients would never have received net interest in any event,
thanks to the federal and state regulatory provisions underlying
IOLTA programs.8 4 Those provisions were relevant to the taking and
compensation issues, and thus to the property issue as well, "because
the way we may ultimately resolve the taking and compensation issues
bears on the way we ought to resolve the property issue. '8 5 It could
turn out that the Texas program had not taken the interest, or it could
turn out that the just compensation for any such taking was zero. The
dissent stressed that, in either event, the majority's holding would end
up being little more than "an inconsequential abstraction. '86
81 Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1931.
82 Beckford v. Tobin, 27 Eng. Rep. 1049, 1051 (Ch. 1749), quoted in Phillips, xi8 S. Ct. at
1930. In criticizing the majority's way of thinking about the meaning of "private property," Jus-
tice Breyer wrote, "The slogan 'interest follows principal' no more answers that question than
does King Diarmed's legendary slogan, '[T]o every cow her calf."' Phillips, I18 S. Ct. at 1938
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (alteration in original); cf Felix Cohen, Dialogue on Pri-
vate Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 365-69 (1954) (elaborating on cows, calves, and the nature
of private property).
83 The balance of the majority opinion was devoted to dismissing counterarguments on the
property issue made by the petitioners and by the United States as amicus curiae. In response to
the argument that the "property" at issue had no value, the Court observed that "property is more
than economic value." Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1933. Even if the value of the interest at stake were
zero, then, the property right in that interest might still be deserving of constitutional protection,
though how it would be protected is unclear. See id. Finally, the Court countered arguments that
the government created the value of the interest by noting that it was the lawyers who pooled the
funds. See id.
84 Id. at 1934 (Souter, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 1935.
86 Id. Accordingly, for Justice Souter, the best method would have been "to consider what is
property only in connection with what is a compensable taking," id., and since the court of ap-
peals had done otherwise, the case should have been sent back to it for application of the correct
approach, see id. at 1937. In the other dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer expressed agreement
with Justice Souter's views but went on to say that even if one accepted, for the sake of argument,
the majority's method of analyzing the property question, the majority had its substantive conclu-
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The ultimate result in Phillips is unlikely to turn on the interpre-
tive tussle between majority and dissenting Justices. After all, nothing
in the majority's approach - analyzing each issue in isolation, seria-
tim - dictates that a taking will be found, or, if one is, that compensa-
tion will be awarded, just as nothing in the method of the dissenters -
analyzing the issues as an integrated whole - necessarily forecloses
such results. Notice also that one cannot even say which approach
generally economizes on the time and expense of litigation. 7
Whose views on contextual severance should be preferred? We do
not know, and indeed, do not much care. The dispute is incapable of
principled resolution and largely irrelevant in any event to the eco-
nomic and ethical concerns that animate the Takings Clause. The ma-
jority and dissenters alike tried to pack too much into the phrase "pri-
vate property"; they wanted the term to do more work than it can
handle. Our view is that the debate among the Justices in Phillips
probably amounts to little more than quibbling.
Yet method matters nonetheless, in a context larger than that
framed by the Justices in Phillips. Both the majority and dissenters
quite clearly acknowledged that while the Texas IOLTA program
might have "taken" something that was "private property," it did not
follow that "just compensation" was necessarily due. Though they
disagreed about other matters, all nine Justices seemed to recognize a
possible pairing of taking/no compensation. On the surface, their re-
sult looks like one of our unconventional alternatives, but we are con-
fident that the Justices had something other than our Box 2 in mind.
What the Justices must have been thinking is that IOLTA programs
might work a taking calling for conventional compensation, but that,
given the unusual nature of IOLTA programs, the measure of that
compensation could well be zero.88
Recall that, in our terms, the taking/no compensation pairing in
Box 2 of our matrix means a taking that does not call for a specific
distribution. We would usually provide for deterrence by way of a
general distribution in Box 2 cases, because in those cases, although
fairness does not require individualized compensation, efficiency con-
sions wrong. See id. at 1937-39 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Souter agreed. See id. at 1937
(Souter, J., dissenting).
87 Justice Souter was concerned to "avoid spending time on what may turn out to be an en-
tirely theoretical matter," id. at 1935, but he failed to realize that the majority's approach actually
saves time in any instance where it leads to a conclusion that no "private property" interest is at
stake, just the result Justice Breyer would have reached in employing the majority's method, see
id. at 1939 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
SS The Takings Clause, after all, "measure[s] any required compensation by the claimant's
loss," as Justice Souter reminded the Court in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 1936 (Souter, J., dis-
senting). Justice Breyer made a similar observation, noting that in takings cases the government
is required to pay the current value of the property taken, not the added value that might result
from what the government subsequently does with the property. See id. at 1939 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting).
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siderations still call for the cost-internalization that a requirement of
payment by the government can provide. The Justices in Phillips
could not have been contemplating our idea of a general distribution in
talking about taking/no compensation, because at the time of the case
our idea did not yet exist. This hardly means, however, that we cannot
think about how Phillips might be resolved in light of our model.
B. Phillips in Our Model
Phillips is a member of a class of cases concerned with government
regulatory programs that impose trivial burdens per capita but, be-
cause a large number of people are affected, may involve substantial
sums in the aggregate. 9 Our general reaction to such cases runs like
this: the small burden per individual could support a conclusion that
no specific distribution is required on fairness grounds or to ease any
"demoralization" among risk-averse property owners. Moreover, given
the large number of people affected, concerns about high settlement
costs suggest that if any distribution at all is to be considered, it should
be a general distribution. If deterrence concerns arise because of the
large aggregate sums at stake, they could be addressed by making the
responsible government bureau pay, as a general deterrent; the obliga-
tion to pay may also be a welcome specific deterrent in instances giv-
ing rise to suspicions that politically vulnerable groups are being ex-
ploited.
But Phillips calls for more particular analysis, in part because it
involves a situation where the government program itself creates value
by pooling property fragments, and in part because the value created
arguably comes at no expense to property owners, meaning, among
other things, that there is no case for general deterrence.
Pooling programs are common, but their analysis has been ne-
glected, especially in connection with takings. 90 In this regard, notice
that both specific and general distribution seem to be impossible in
IOLTA cases, because there is nothing to distribute. The claimants
89 See supra note 30.
90 Pooling cases arise when the government attempts to overcome a tragedy of the commons or
of the anticommons by bundling fragmented property interests:
In a commons, by definition, multiple owners are each endowed with the [right] to use a
given resource, and no one has the right to exclude another. When too many owners have
such [rights] of use, the resource is prone to overuse - a tragedy of the commons.... In an
anticommons .... multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from
a scarce resource, and no one has an effective [right] of use. When there are too many
owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse - a tragedy of the
anticommons.
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, iii HARV. L. REv. 621, 623-24 (1998); see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisen-
berg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE
698, 700 (1998) (arguing that patent policy may create too many fragmented rights and may re-
quire later government intervention to facilitate pooling).
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suffered no loss by the conventional measure, and using an alternative
measure - one that made the government pay back the interest
earned by the pooled accounts - would amount to wiping out IOLTA
programs altogether. Phillips, then, is a pooling case, but of an un-
usual sort, and unusual cases might call for measures that rely on some
mechanism other than payment of money by and to the parties in the
lawsuit. To put ourselves in a position to think about such measures,
we first have to consider how pooling creates value generally, and how
it does so in IOLTA programs in particular.
Property interests with little realizable value when owned indi-
vidually often gain value when pooled, due to economies of scale.
Pooling generates value whenever the addition of one more individ-
ual's assets marginally increases the gains from, or decreases the costs
of, exploiting all the group's assets in the aggregate. IOLTA programs
rely less on increasing gains than on decreasing costs. True, there
might be increasing gains if banks pay slightly higher rates of interest
as account balances go up: for example, a bank might pay 5.2% on a
single pooled account of $2000 (for an annual yield of $io4), but only
5% on ten individual accounts of $200 each (for a total annual yield of
$ioo). But increasing gains of this sort are a minor factor in IOLTA
programs, because accounts are pooled only within each lawyer's of-
fice, rather than on some wider basis, such as across the state. Each
additional client dollar earns about what it could have before, so the
marginal benefit curve is nearly flat and the cumulative interest in-
creases at an approximately linear rate with each new client.
Decreasing costs, on the other hand, are a very salient feature of
IOLTA programs, which realize substantial economies of scale in gen-
erating and distributing interest. (Recall that the programs apply only
to funds incapable of earning net interest for individual clients.) By
pooling client funds, lawyers avoid the trouble of opening, tracking,
and closing separate accounts for each individual or corporation.
Economies in the distribution of interest are even more significant.
Payment is made to a single agency rather than to multiple clients, no
tax identification numbers are needed, and accounting expenses (for
tax and other purposes) are dramatically reduced.91
So the Court in Phillips was wrong when it said that the Texas
IOLTA program "does nothing to create value. '92 To extend the ex-
ample we introduced above, suppose it would cost a lawyer $20 to
generate and distribute $io in interest earned in a single client's ac-
91 See Brief of Amici Curiae Alabama Law Foundation, Inc. et al. in Support of Petitioners,
Phillips, 118 S. Ct. 1925 (No. 96-1578), available in 1997 WL 476500, at *5-*6 (detailing the cost
savings from pooling in the generation and distribution of interest earned on client funds) (citing
ABA Task Force and Advisory Board on Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts, Report to the Board
of Governors 22-24 (July 26, i982)).
92 Phillips, uS S. Ct. at 1933.
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count. If instead ten accounts were pooled and earned $104, the costs
of generating and distributing that amount would probably be much
less than $104 if the whole sum were paid to a single agency, but well
over $104 if the interest were distributed pro rata to each client. 93
In deciding whether IOLTA interest was property, the majority in
Phillips focused on the gross interest corresponding to a single client's
principal. In contrast, the dissenters argued that if any interest-related
number were relevant, it would be the net interest available for distri-
bution in the unpooled case, by definition a negative amount. Neither
approach addresses the novel takings issues that pooling raises; the
most salient numbers are those more or less ignored in Phillips.
One of these is the net interest that a marginal client could deny to
a mandatory IOLTA program if the client were allowed an "opt-out"
option, say by directing that her principal not go into her lawyer's
IOLTA account. 94 Justice Breyer probably had this in mind when he
said that the "most that Texas law here could have taken from the cli-
ent is ... the client's right to keep the client's principal sterile, a right
to prevent the principal from being put to productive use by others."95
Notice, though, that Justice Breyer's observation is not quite correct.
A marginal client's choice to opt out of an IOLTA program would not
render the client's principal "sterile"; the money would remain produc-
tive, but the resulting interest would be enjoyed by depository banks.
Essentially, IOLTA programs redistribute wealth from organizations
that provide banking services for depositors to organizations that pro-
vide legal services for the poor.
93 Note that states can generate scale efficiencies more easily than can individual clients, but
the cumulative net interest is not necessarily an overall efficiency gain for society. Just as IOLTA
programs shifted $ioo million in interest to states, so could the states have collected the same
amount using targeted taxes on banks, lawyers, clients, or other consumers of the public goods
that the legal system provides its users. Depending on the costs of these alternative methods of
collecting and redistributing funds for legal services, IOLTA programs may or may not be socially
efficient. This feature of IOLTA makes Phillips the odd pooling case; normally, pooling will result
in efficiency gains.
Regulatory schemes that exploit scale economies will usually impose monetary harm on a
number of people; each individual's burden shifts the marginal cost curve upward but does not
affect its shape. The more each individual is harmed, the larger the pool necessary before cumu-
lative benefits exceed total costs; at the extreme, per capita harms can be so high that the program
in question will be inefficient no matter how large the pool of contributors becomes. At the same
time, though, some regulatory programs may yield marginal benefits that increase at a faster rate
than they do in, say, IOLTA programs. For example, the value of government provision of some
goods may benefit from network effects, in which "the utility that a user derives from consump-
tion of [the] good increases with the number of other agents consuming the good." Michael L.
Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
424, 424 (1985) (defining "network effects").
94 This discussion pertains to mandatory IOLTA programs only. If lawyers can opt out, as
many states now allow, then clients could indirectly opt out by choosing a nonparticipating law-
yer. Voluntary and opt-out programs involve giving, not taking; with respect to them, just com-
pensation is irrelevant.
95 Phillips, 1 i S. Ct. at 1938 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The other salient number ignored by the majority in Phillips is the
cumulative net interest that IOLTA programs earn from pooling, a
sum by definition not capable of specific distribution (because such a
distribution would make IOLTA pointless). While the majority de-
ferred discussing it,96 Justices Souter and Breyer happily noted that
conventional just compensation doctrine would assign this new value
to the government, because it was generated by the government pro-
gram at issue.97 Our approach opens up new possibilities for distrib-
uting the cumulative gains from pooling in ways that would better
serve the purposes of the Takings Clause. For example, certain forms
of general distribution could give clients just what mandatory IOLTA
programs take away: the right to determine the uses to which the
earnings from principal are put, or what we call "client-voice."
Whereas conventional takings law focuses on unpooled gross and net
interest, an approach based on deterrence and distribution rightly
shifts attention to opt-out and client-voice alternatives.
D. Deterrence and Distribution in Phillips
A better approach to Phillips is to identify the deterrence and dis-
tribution issues at stake and to uncouple them in a way that makes
matters more tractable. In this respect, however, the case is far from
transparent to us. The path taken by all the Justices resulted in,
among other things, a conventional factual record that is inadequate
for our unconventional purposes. On the deterrence side, we need to
know if IOLTA programs are likely to be so inefficient or oppressive as
to require some sort of check on the government; with respect to dis-
tribution, we need more nuanced information about the plaintiffs'
fairness claims and options for redressing them. In the absence of a
more developed record, we can only offer some initial speculations.
Pooling programs can raise questions about inefficiency and gen-
eral deterrence, but the particular kind of pooling involved in IOLTA
programs seems untroubling. All IOLTA programs generate value, yet
even the mandatory ones inflict no actual monetary harm on any indi-
vidual. The degree of harm is clear, and clearly trivial, per capita and
in the aggregate, making general deterrence a nonissue. So too for
specific deterrence. Clients who deposit money in lawyers' trust fund
accounts do not strike us as politically vulnerable. Though IOLTA
programs may not be the least costly way to fund legal services for the
96 See Phillips, i8 S. Ct at 1934 (deferring discussion of the taking and just compensation
issues).
97 Justice Souter explained that courts would "measure any required compensation by the
claimant's loss, not by the government's (or the public's) gain." Id. at 1936 (Souter, J., dissenting).
And, drawing an analogy to land valuation cases, Justice Breyer noted that "the government must
pay the current value of condemned land, not the added value that a highway it builds on the
property itself creates." Id. at 1939 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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poor, they are not egregiously inefficient and do not seem likely to have
costly collateral consequences; for example, clients are unlikely to re-
spond by underusing the legal system.
Fairness concerns are more troubling in Phillips, partly because
conventional just compensation doctrine responds so poorly to the ex-
pressive and liberty interests at stake in the case. 98 In IOLTA pro-
grams, monetary losses are not the crux. Denial of client-voice is. In
this light, the majority's position in the case seems more than a little
odd. The Chief Justice's opinion separated interest from the principal
to which it owed. The interest was a real thing that might quite liter-
ally have been taken (the takings issue, recall, was remanded); IOLTA's
redistribution of the productive capacity of the principal, on the other
hand, was regarded as "at most" a regulation of the "use of the prop-
erty,"99 the plain implication being that it would pass constitutional
muster. 10 0 Yet the interest so captivating to the majority is worth ab-
solutely nothing, zero, to clients depositing principal. At the same
time, the denial of aggrieved IOLTA conscripts' ability to control the
way in which their principal is used seems to have concerned the
Court not at all. In short, the majority focused on a trivial injury, but
ignored a substantial insult.
If considerations of justice were thought to require it, a court (as-
suming it has the authority) could instruct the responsible government
agency to make a general distribution that gives clients a voice in the
use of IOLTA funds (say by voting whether to support legal services
for the richer instead of the poorer), or could allow clients or their law-
yers to opt out of (or not opt into) the program.1 0' But IOLTA pro-
grams do not seem to be a more oppressive means of raising funds
than a straight tax on clients or other consumers of legal services
would be, so such a move strikes us as unnecessary. We see the argu-
ments for calling Phillips a Box 2 case, but we conclude, tentatively,
that it ends up fitting best in Box i. Mandatory IOLTA programs
should probably be viewed as ordinary regulations.
V. DEMOLISHING AND REBUILDING THE TAKINGS CLAUSE:
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
Presumably, more than a few of our readers will accuse us of de-
molishing the Takings Clause and building something else in its place.
We (and many accessories before the fact) are guilty of the second
98 See supra note 66 (noting the plaantiffs' First Amendment concerns).
99 Phillips, 1I8 S. Ct. at 1930 (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992)).
100 See id.
101 Though the tax treatment of client-voice and opt-out options would differ, takings analysis
should not be tied to such concerns. With a client-voice system, the Internal Revenue Service
would probably impute IOLTA interest to clients as income; with an opt-out system, there would
be no imputed income. See id. at 1933 (citing the relevant IRS interpretations).
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charge, but not the first. The Supreme Court started the process of
demolition seventy-five years ago. Before then, takings law was pretty
simple and solid, if not particularly satisfying. When the government
took title to property or actually occupied it, then just compensation
was due; otherwise it was not. Matters started to get complicated in
1922, when the Court decided Pennsylvania Coal.10 2 Suddenly, even
the burdens worked by regulatory measures might amount to takings,
unless the measures were intended to control nuisances. Developments
since have only added to the muddle, but we shall refrain from a blow-
by-blow description because even an abbreviated account would bore
aficionados, and only a lengthy one would satisfy anybody else. Let an
annotated inventory suffice. Supreme Court decisions over the last
three-quarters of a century have obscured and bifurcated the nuisance
exception to regulatory takings; 10 3 have waffled on the question of
conceptual severance; 10 4 have distinguished inconsistently between
permanent and temporary takings; 05 have suggested that what is not
just compensation actually is just compensation, if only regulators are
crafty;10 6 have made little of large losses, 07 unless they are entire, 08
and much of small ones, 0 9 even when they are zero;" 0 have become
confused about what "private property" is for purposes of the Takings
Clause;"' have, in short, turned the words of the Takings Clause into
102 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 26o U.S. 393 (I922).
103 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. OO3, 1022-28 (1992) (limiting
the nuisance exception to common law nuisances); Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 491-93 (1987) (viewing as "tantamount to public nuisances" the very uses that were not
regarded as nuisances in Pennsylvania Coal); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 133 n.30 (1978) (questioning the distinctive character of the nuisance exception).
104 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 77, at 1157, 1165, 1177, 1208 (noting the
Court's inconsistent application of conceptual severance).
105 See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 318 (1987) (conflating temporary and permanent physical invasions); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982) (distinguishing between permanent and tempo-
rary physical invasions).
106 See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137 (implying that transferable development rights can-
not be, but on the other hand may be, just compensation); DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 77,
at 1167 (discussing the paradox in the Court's approach).
107 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384, 397 (1926) (holding that
a 75% diminution in the value of property is acceptable).
108 See, e.g., Lucas, 5os U.S. at ioig n.8 (distinguishing between total deprivation of value and
deprivations only slightly less than total).
109 See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35 (holding that permanent physical invasions are takings
even when they have "only minimal economic impact on the owner").
110 See, e.g., Phillips, 118 S. Ct at 1933 (observing that a taking may be found even when the
property in question has no "positive economic or market value," and applying the observation to
a zero amount of interest).
111 See, e.g., Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2155 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment and dissenting in part) (criticizing the Court's extension of takings doctrine to a
situation involving no "specific property right or interest"); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-17
(1987) (suggesting that the right to exclude and the right to devise are "essential sticks in the bun-
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a cryptogram that only the Justices in a given case are able to decipher
(and seldom do all of them agree).
So demolition has been the Court's doing, and the mess is hardly
surprising: changing times, values, politics, and personalities result in
new and different views among the members of the Court, yet our con-
stitutional tradition requires that the Justices always moor their opin-
ions to particular words. The tie has held, but only because the words
have been stretched beyond recognition. To make sense of the Takings
Clause, it is time to look behind its text to its purposes, and go anew
from there. One such purpose is obviously fairness, but another is
necessarily efficiency, thanks to Pennsylvania Coal. Whatever the
Court's decision in that case left obscure, it made clear that regulations
are often a substitute for eminent domain. There is abundant agree-
ment that the power of eminent domain is justified and constrained for
reasons having to do, in part, with efficient use of society's resources.
It would be strange to suppose that the same is not true of regulatory
substitutes.
A problem with this observation is that it calls up the ghost of sub-
stantive due process. If the courts are to review regulatory measures
with efficiency in mind and the means for deterrence in hand, then ar-
guably this is little different from empowering them to second-guess
the legislature generally. But the Court does that now, at least in the
context of takings. In its first exaction case, the Nollan majority es-
tablished a practice of reviewing land-use regulations with unusually
close attention to the connection between ends and means. 1 2 Then, in
its subsequent decision in Dolan, the Court insisted upon rough pro-
portionality between the thing exacted and the development permitted
in exchange."*3 Dissenting in the latter case, Justice Stevens remarked
on the majority's "application of what is essentially the doctrine of
substantive due process."1'1 4
Seemingly, the Fifth Amendment's limitation to measures taking
"private property" would constrain the judiciary's freedom to strike
down regulatory programs, but that constraint has just recently been
loosened considerably. In its decision last year in Eastern Enterprises
v. Apfel," 5 the Court considered the constitutionality of legislation
holding certain employers retroactively liable for employee retirement
die of rights that are commonly called property," whereas the right to sell is perhaps not); Heller,
supra note I at 103-04, 139-40 (discussing conflicts in the Court's definition of private property).
112 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) (closely scrutinizing the
relationship between a regulatory measure and the ends it claims to advance).
113 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 5 12 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (announcing a "rough proportionality"
test).
114 Id. at 410 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998).
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benefits." 6 The plurality invalidated the measure as a taking, even
though it concerned no standard property interest.117 The move
prompted Justice Kennedy to caution that the Court must be "careful
not to lose sight of the importance of identifying the property allegedly
taken, lest all governmental action be subjected to examination under
the constitutional prohibition against taking without just compensa-
tion, with the attendant potential for money damages."" 8
The question of appropriate limitations on the scope of judicial re-
view is not our problem. Whatever the boundaries of the Takings
Clause, we think there is much to be gained by analyzing takings in
terms of the clause's underlying purposes, and by understanding that
efficiency and justice are best served by uncoupling matters and meth-
ods of deterrence from matters and methods of distribution. Thus
might we develop a body of law as supple as the challenges it con-
fronts.
116 See Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (1994 &
Supp. II 1997).
117 See Eastern Enters., 18 S. Ct. at 2146-53.
118 Id. at 2 I56 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
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